The Secretary, Home and Territories Department, has asked for an opinion as to whether on the facts disclosed there are good grounds for an appeal against the decision of the Special Magistrate dismissing an information under section 11 of the Observance of Law Ordinance 1921 of the Northern Territory.

The facts are set out in the following telegram from the Administrator:

Your 25th statement prepared by Barratt herewith begins Information laid under section 11 sub-section (b) of Ordinance number 13 of 1921 for unlawfully interfering by intimidating the right of informant to continue in employment as labourer discharging Marella whereby he was prevented from continuing in employment. Facts proved as follows: A. member of another union was approached by union representative who informed him men would not work Marella unless A. took ticket their union. A. refuses take ticket representative then saw stevedore and told him men refused work Marella unless A. took ticket in their union. Stevedore sent for A. who was again informed position when he again refused take ticket. Stevedore then informed him he would have to discharge him as could not have Marella held up. Accordingly A. discharged, union man put in his place. A. had prior to this worked for two hours also had worked last boat never requested take ticket previously but only when Marella alongside to be discharged. End of facts. Defence called no evidence. Magistrate dismissed information declaring amongst other things no evidence of intimidation on facts here set out. Does information on facts disclose offence under section named? Ends. Apparently case turns on meaning of word intimidation as used in Ordinance.

Section 11 of the Observance of Law Ordinance 1921 is as follows:

Any person who, by threats, intimidation, violence, force or any physical act, interferes with the right of any person-

1. to carry on his lawful occupation;
2. to obtain or accept or continue in employment; or
3. to obtain any goods or services or the delivery of any goods,

shall be guilty of an offence.

Penalty : Fifty pounds or imprisonment for six months.

The informant was informed by the representative of the North Australian Industrial Union that the members of that Union would not work the ship unless he joined their union, but he refused to do so. The stevedore, having placed the position before the informant, and the informant still refusing to join, then discharged him. According to the facts no threats of violence were used, but the other men simply refused to work with the informant who was dismissed to avert a strike.

The information stated that the defendant intimidated the right of the informant to continue in employment as a labourer. The word 'intimidation' as ordinarily used signifies the use of threats or violence in order to force or to restrain from some action or to interfere with the free exercise of political or social rights (Oxford Dictionary). On the facts submitted I am of opinion that the action of the defendant could not be construed to accord with the above definition of intimidation. Some violence or fear of violence would be necessary to satisfy the definition.

In the interpretation of statutes, the general rule is that words are given their ordinary accepted meaning, and I can see no reason why an unusual meaning should in this instance be imported into the word.

The case of Gibson v. Lawson [1891] 2 Q.B. 545, in which the facts were almost identical with those in this instance, involved the interpretation of the following section of an Imperial Act (Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875):

Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority-

(1) Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children or injures his property . . . shall on conviction thereof be liable . . .

In the course of his judgment Lord Coleridge C.J. stated:

'Intimidate' is not ... a term of art-it is a word of common speech and everyday use; and it must receive, therefore, a reasonable and sensible interpretation according to the circumstances of the cases as they arise ... in this case it appears to us all that there was nothing which, under any reasonable construction of the word 'intimidate', could be brought within it.

I am of opinion that an appeal from the decision of the Special Magistrate would not be successful.

[Vol, 18, p. 380]