The following memorandum has been forwarded by the Secretary to the Department of External Affairs for advice:

On 25 June last the period of the proclamation of the Fergusson 'New' Goldfield expired, but on 4 July such period was by a subsequent proclamation extended to 25 July 1915.

On 12 May last the period of the proclamation of the Jenberrie 'New' Goldfield expired, but on 4 July such period was extended by a subsequent proclamation to 12 May 1915.

During the interim of resuscitation and expiry, Asiatic aliens (holders of current miners' rights) went and mined on both Fields and are still there, some on tribute to European claim holders and others on their own, there being about 25 of such on each of the two Fields now.

Some correspondence has taken place between this Office and Dr Jensen, the Director of Mines, copy of which I attach, but nothing definite was arrived at regarding the strict enforcement of the N.T. Mining Act 1903, clause 144.

Before coming to a final decision, His Excellency may consider it advisable that legal opinion be obtained from the Crown Law Officers on the questions raised by these two subsequent proclamations viz.-

1. The legality or otherwise of a proclamation extending a period of a prior proclamation of a new goldfield when some time had elapsed after the expiry of the decreed period of force and effect of the prior proclamation.

2. Should subsequent proclamation be lawful, does such annul and make void all contracts and agreements of whatsoever nature made during the interim of expiry and resuscitation, so far as, and in respect to mining with Asiatic alien labour on lands affected by such subsequent proclamation i.e. is such a proclamation retrospectively operative in all matters pertaining to those mining laws relative to proclaimed new goldfields (clauses 8 and 14, 17, 19, 21 and 144 of N.T. Mining Act 1903)?

As to question (a): Section 14 of The Northern Territory Mining Act 1903 provides:

Every goldfield shall be deemed to be a new goldfield until after the lapse of two years from the date of the first Proclamation of such goldfield in the Government Gazette (whether such Proclamation was made under this Act or under any Act hereby repealed) or until after the lapse of such further period from such last-mentioned date as the Governor may at any time by Proclamation declare or appoint.

The power contained in the last three lines of this section is in effect a power to extend by proclamation the period during which a goldfield is to be deemed to be a new goldfield. The section purports to give the Governor power at any time to extend the period. There must however, in my opinion, be some limitation on the meaning of the words 'at any time', otherwise the Governor could issue a proclamation many years after a goldfield had ceased to be a new goldfield. I am of opinion therefore that the words 'at any time' must be read as meaning 'at any time during the period in which the goldfield is deemed to be a new goldfield'.

This opinion appears to derive some support from the decision of the Court of King's Bench in the case of Brooke v. Clarke 1 B. & Aid. 396. The question at issue in that case was whether an Act of Parliament which was passed for the purpose of extending the term of copyright in works already published applied to works in which the term of copyright had expired before the commencement of the Act, or to those only in which the term was unexpired. It was held by the Court that the Act applied only to the latter works, for the reason that the word 'extension' was a term properly used for the purpose of enlarging or giving further duration to an existing right, but did not import the revesting of an expired right; that would not be an extension, but a re-creation.

I am therefore of opinion that a proclamation made after the lapse of the period allowed by the Act or where that period has been legally extended by proclamation, after the lapse of such extended period, is not effective to extend the period.

In view of my opinion on question (a), question (b) does not call for a reply.

[Vol. 12, p. 207]